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INTRODUCTION
This paper will examine two landmark judgments of the Supreme Court. 
Both cases are significant in that they represent fundamental dealings with 
people who are members as well as those who desire to become members of 
the Japanese society1). Both are related to globalization and its effects on the 
people making them more mobile. The first case that follows involved a dis-
pute on the constitutionality of the Japanese election system that involved 
Japanese citizens residing overseas. The second case involved a dispute on 
the constitutionality of the nationality law that required parents to marry if a 
child was born to a Japanese father and foreign mother out of wedlock and if 
the father acknowledged the child after birth. The paper will examine the 
process in which both cases developed and the significance of each judge-
ment on Japanese society.
196 ????????????????????
I. MAINTAINING VOTING RIGHTS ACROSS BORDERS
A. Efforts Involved in Keeping in Line with the Changing Environment
Japanese citizens residing overseas are able to vote using the Zaigai 
Senkyo Seido (hereinafter, Overseas Voters Election System)2). This system 
was ﬁrst established in 1998 when it initially allowed Japanese citizens resid-
ing overseas to vote in the proportional representation elections for the 
Shugi’in (House of Representatives) and Sangi’in (House of Councillors) 
elections as a result of an amendment of the Koshoku Senkyo Ho (hereinafter, 
Public Offices Election Law)3). Japanese citizens residing overseas were 
eventually allowed to vote in the single-member district elections after 
another amendment of the Public Offices Election Law in 20064). The estab-
lishment of this system involved a long legislative process that began in 1982 
which culminated in a Supreme Court judgment that enabled the Overseas 
Voters Election System to be corrected5).
The advancement of globalization created an environment that required 
Japanese companies to become more international and more mobile. In turn, 
Japanese companies were sending more and more of their employees over-
seas, sometimes requiring them to reside there for long term. An important 
issue that arose from this internationalized environment was how to main-
tain citizens’ voting rights if and when Japanese citizens were to live away 
from home for an extended period of time. The Public Offices Election Law 
at the time only allowed citizens of twenty years of age or older to vote in 
elections only if they were registered with the electoral commission in the 
district that they resided in for at least three months6). In October 1982, the 
Senkyo Seido Chosakai (Research Commission on the Electoral System of 
the Liberal Democratic Party) decided it was time to adopt an “overseas vot-
ing system” and asked the Ministry of Home Affairs to develop a govern-
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ment proposal which could be submitted to the Diet for consideration. As 
the proposal was being developed in 1983, the Ministry of Home Affairs and 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs experienced difficulty in agreeing on how 
this system was to be executed7). One issue that was particularly difficult 
involved how to maintain a fair procedure of voting. The Ministry of Home 
Affairs felt that a fair voting procedure could be maintained by implementing 
onsite voting at the foreign consulates instead of votes being sent in by mail. 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs initially could not agree with this proposal 
because of their concern with the burden involved in maintaining the polling 
stations. However, this conflict was resolved after the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs decided to strengthen administration and increase personnel within 
each of the consulates. Thereafter, legislation proposing an amendment to 
the Public Offices Election Law (bill for the Overseas Voters Election Law) 
was submitted to the 101th Diet in April 19848).
The 1984 bill for the Overseas Voters Election Law set out to establish a 
new voter registration system and voting system for overseas voters9). To 
qualify to register under this new system, a prospective voter would be 
required to have resided over three months in a foreign country and have 
intentions to move back to Japan in the future. If he/she resided in the for-
eign country for less than ﬁve years since moving there, he/she would have 
to apply through the foreign consulate of the proper jurisdiction to the local 
electoral commission of his/her last local address. If he/she resided over-
seas for over five years, then he/she would have to apply through the for-
eign consulate of the proper jurisdiction to the local electoral commission of 
his/her Honseki (location of his/her family registry). Registration would be 
complete only after the local electoral commission approved the application. 
After the registration is approved, the overseas voter would be allowed to 
vote between the days of the public announcement for the start of the elec-
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tion until five days before election day. The voter’s ballot is sent by the con-
sulate to the local electoral commission and is counted in the same way as an 
absentee ballot. Special national elections to ﬁll a vacancy would, for the time 
being, not be included in this system. The bill also mentioned that the penal-
ties for election law violations would also apply for the Overseas Voters 
Election System10).
During the following year, consideration of this bill was terminated at 
the committee level due to a more immediate election problem—reappor-
tionment of Diet seats for the House of Representatives—that the govern-
ment had to resolve, and it was officially abandoned as a result of the disso-
lution of the House of Representatives thereafter during the 105th Diet in 
198611).
In 1991, the Liberal Democratic Party announced their intentions in 
resuming discussion to establish the Overseas Voters Election System. And, in 
June 1992, the Gyosei Kaikaku Suishin Shingikai (hereinafter, Administrative 
Reform Council) included in their third report a section referring to the 
securement of election rights for citizens residing overseas. In August 1993, 
the Minister of Home Affairs under the Hosokawa Cabinet recommended 
that a bill be created to include the right to vote for citizens residing over-
seas. A group of Japanese citizens residing in New York gathered 1,600 sig-
natures for a petition demanding the establishment of an overseas voters 
election system. The petition was sent to the Hosokawa Cabinet in November 
1993. In the following year, an organization called the Kaigai Yukensha 
Nettowa’aku (hereinafter, Japanese Overseas Voters Network) was established. 
In 1995, this organization requested assistance in their movement for human 
rights remedy to the Human Rights Committee of the Japan Federation of 
Bar Associations. Thereafter, in March 1996, the Human Rights Committee 
produced a “Research Report on the Voting System for Japanese Citizens 
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Residing Overseas12).” And, in May 1996, the same Committee sent a “Petition 
for the Establishment of an Overseas Voters Election System for Japanese 
Citizens” to both Chairpersons of the House of Representatives and the 
House of Councillors, the Prime Minister, the Minister of Justice, the Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, and the Minister of Home Affairs13). This movement inﬂu-
enced a group of 53 Japanese citizens to bring a suit to the Tokyo District 
Court in November 199614). The plaintiffs lost in both the District and Higher 
Courts, but were able to attain a remarkable victory in the Supreme Court. 
The Supreme Court Judgment ultimately helped to change the electoral sys-
tem to what it is today.
B. The Overseas Voters Case15)
This case disputed the constitutionality of the Japanese election sys-
tem16) that involved Japanese citizens residing overseas. The Public Offices 
Election Law was amended after the suit was brought to court in 1998. 
Before the amendment of 1998, Japanese citizens were not allowed to vote if 
they resided overseas since they would not have an address registered with 
the Jumin Kihon Daicho (hereafter, Basic Residence Registry) in Japan 
which was a prerequisite to register for the electoral commission to vote in 
elections. One of the arguments brought to the District Court17) was that this 
condition before the 1998 amendment of the Public Offices Election Law 
deprived Japanese citizens of their election rights and therefore was uncon-
stitutional because it violated Article 14, paragraph 1, Article 15, paragraph 1 
and 3, Article 43, and Article 44, as well as Article 25 of the International 
Covenants on Civil and Political Rights. A second argument was that as a 
result of failure of the government to correct this unconstitutional condition, 
Japanese citizens residing overseas were deprived of their right to vote and 
therefore demanded the government to pay damages (of 50,000 yen) to all 
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those included in the suit. While the case was being argued at the district 
court level, an amendment to the Public Offices Election Law was passed 
by the Diet in 1998 establishing a new Japanese Overseas Citizens Voter 
Registration System18). However, this amendment only partially corrected 
the system allowing Japanese citizens residing overseas to register to 
vote19) for the proportional representation elections for both the House of 
Representatives and House of Councillors, but for an undetermined period 
disallowed this right for the single-seat district elections for both Houses20). 
The plaintiffs made an additional claim asking the court for a declaratory 
judgment confirming that this condition of not allowing Japanese citizens 
residing overseas to vote in single-seat district elections for both Houses to 
be unconstitutional. Thereafter, in the plaintif fs’ appeal, they asked the 
Tokyo High Court (in addition to the three arguments presented in the 
District Court) to confirm that they in fact had a right to vote in the single-
seat district elections for both Houses21).
The plaintiffs’ arguments were denied both in the District Court and 
High Court. The plaintif fs (13 of the 53 original members) thereafter 
appealed to the Supreme Court and the judgment of the Court was rendered 
by the Grand Bench on September 14, 200522). The Court’s judgment on the 
issue of constitutionality of the Public Offices Election Law disallowing the 
right to vote to Japanese citizens residing overseas for not having a local 
address with the Basic Residence Registry (law before the 1998 amendment) 
during the October 20, 1996, House of Representative elections was that it 
violated Article 15, paragraph 1 and 3, Article 43, paragraph 1, and Article 44 
of the Constitution23). On the issue of the amended law limiting voting rights 
to only the proportional representation elections of both Houses, the Court 
judged that it violated the Constitution and that the election rights should 
have been adjusted to include the single-seat district elections for both 
201
Constitutional Perspectives on Changes Occurring  
in Contemporary Japanese Society (1)
Houses by the next election immediately scheduled after this Supreme 
Court judgment24). Since this period witnessed a remarkable development of 
communication means of global scale (referring to the internet), the Court 
could not agree with the government’s argument that it would be difﬁcult to 
appropriately disseminate information to voters overseas to execute a fair 
election25). The Court also confirmed that the Japanese citizens residing 
overseas had a legitimate case in bringing the issue of eligibility to vote in 
the next single-seat district elections of both Houses based on their overseas 
status (voter registration for Japanese citizens residing overseas)26). The 
Court also declared that unless there was a compelling interest by the gov-
ernment to deprive Japanese citizens residing overseas of their voting rights, 
the Diet would be obligated to pass legislation to guarantee their constitu-
tional right to vote. In cases where there was a clear violation, and in extraor-
dinary instances, Article 1 paragraph 1 of the Kokkabaisho Ho (hereinafter, 
Government Redress Law) may be used to remedy the situation. And, in this 
case, the Court declared that there was a clear violation, in that, the govern-
ment’s failure in passing legislation and taking over 10 years to do so and not 
enabling Japanese citizens residing overseas to vote in the 1996 national 
elections could be considered an extraordinary instance, and therefore the 
government was liable to pay for damages (solatium) to the amount of 5,000 
yen per person27).
In this case, there were two dissenting opinions as well as one concur-
ring opinion. The joint dissenting opinion by Justices Yoko’o and Ueda 
denied the plaintiffs’ claims of unconstitutionality for both conditions estab-
lished before and after the 1998 amendment of the Public Offices Election 
Law, explaining that the concrete decisions made to decide details of the 
election system to elect the members of both Houses were within the 
responsibility of the Diet. The Constitution states that the details pertaining 
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to “the numbers of the members of each House (Article 43, paragraph 2),” 
“qualifications of members of both Houses and their electors (Article 44),” 
“electoral districts, method of voting and other matters pertaining to the 
method of election of members of both Houses (Article 47),” were in princi-
ple, within the discretion of the Diet. This is so that the Diet can take respon-
sibility in assuring the administration of a fair election without confusion28). 
Undeniably, all Japanese citizens have voting rights, however, Japanese citi-
zens residing overseas are in a more difficult situation than those domesti-
cally situated in that there are social as well as technical constraints that may 
hinder the assurance of fairness when voting29). Also, when the Diet 
amended the Public Offices Election Law in 1998 to create a new overseas 
voting registration system, but only included the opportunity to vote in the 
proportional representation election of both Houses (but not for single-seat 
district elections of both Houses), the Diet felt that the twelve to seventeen 
days allowed for the election campaign made it extremely difficult to supply 
information about the candidates to those residing overseas. Under these 
circumstances, this decision to limit the election and its efforts in securing 
an election environment overseas where voters can vote freely, protecting 
against election violations within the various social and technical constraints 
was rationally based and could not be considered illegal nor unconstitutional. 
Justices Yoko’o and Ueda also denied the plaintiffs’ argument that the Diet’s 
failure in passing legislation to establish an Overseas Voters Election System 
denied Japanese citizens residing overseas to vote in the 1996 elections and 
infringed on their right to vote, and therefore the government was not liable 
to pay for damages under the Government Redress Law.
The other dissenting opinion was written by Justice Izumi. It focused on 
the disagreement of the majority opinion to accept the argument to pay a 
solatium to the amount of 5,000 yen per person using the Government 
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Redress Law because the plaintiffs experienced mental anguish as a result of 
not being able to participate in the election. In his dissent, Justice Izumi 
argued that the plaintiffs’ real objective to use the Government Redress Law 
was not to claim damages in ﬁnancial terms, but was to show the unconstitu-
tionality of the Public Offices Election Law that disallowed the right to vote 
in elections, and indirectly to suggest the need for legislation to rectify the 
condition. The Justice added that although the right to vote was a fundamen-
tal right oriented to the individual, voting for members of both Houses as a 
group had a public character to it, so it could not be considered purely indi-
vidualistic. And, the mental anguish that the plaintiffs’ claimed they experi-
enced by not being able to vote reached out to several hundreds of thousand 
Japanese citizens residing overseas. This claim did not fit well with the con-
cept of redressing damages in financial terms in that it would be difficult to 
evaluate each’s mental anguish30).
The concurring opinion was written by Justice Fukuda who attempted 
to refute the dissenting opinions’ arguments. In refuting Justice Izumi’s dis-
senting opinion, Justice Fukuda said that he understood the logic of the 
argument that the claim of damages did not fit well with the concept of the 
Government Redress Law, however, other than being emotionally satisfied 
with the decision in rectifying the right to vote, there was no other remedy 
but to pay a solatium. And, paying damages for the actions or inactions of the 
Diet and members of the Diet would let them know that if the right to vote 
which is the foundation of representative democracy is disallowed or 
infringed in any way, citizens’ tax money would be used to pay for damages 
whatever the amount may be31).
Justice Fukuda also refuted Justices Yoko’o and Ueda’s dissenting opin-
ion. According Justice Fukuda, the legislature was the core of representative 
democracy. And, the legislature established its legitimacy by “equal, free and 
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periodic elections.” The Diet in almost all cases (hotondo) does not have the 
discretion to disallow or limit the citizens’ right to vote from the perspective 
of maintaining equal, free and periodic elections. Disallowing or limiting citi-
zens’ right to vote will jeopardize the authority of the Diet’s national powers 
as the supreme organ of the state, as well as jeopardize the legitimacy of the 
Diet and members of the Diet. Sovereignty by the people is one of the ideals 
of the Constitution of Japan and it must not be forgotten that Japan is a 
nation based on representative democracy. Justice Fukuda asserted in his 
conclusion that if we are a representative democracy, we must reconsider 
the idea of not allowing our citizens to vote for the sole reason that they 
reside overseas32).
C. The Significance of the Overseas Voters Case
One significant point of this Judgment was that the Justices used strict 
scrutiny to decide it and, as Professor Yasuo Hasebe has suggested, the 
Judgment set a “constitutional baseline” that guaranteed all citizens equal 
opportunity to vote in national elections33). In this manner, the government 
was required to establish election rights actively to meet the demands of the 
constitutional baseline. In restricting voting rights of Japanese citizens resid-
ing overseas, the government needed to show a compelling interest. The 
majority opinion could not ﬁnd a compelling interest to justify restrictions in 
neither before nor after the 1998 amendment to the Public Offices Election 
Law. In drawing this “constitutional baseline,” the dissenting opinion written 
by Justices Yoko’o and Ueda reached a different approach from that of the 
majority, in that, it asserted that matters concerning the numbers of mem-
bers of each House (Article 43, paragraph 2), the qualiﬁcation of members of 
both Houses and their electors (Article 44), electoral districts, method of 
voting and other matters pertaining to the method of election of members of 
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both Houses (Article 47), in principle, were to be decided based on legisla-
tive discretion and were matters within the responsibility of the Diet34). But, 
the concurring opinion by Justice Fukuda refuted Justices Yoko’o and Ueda’s 
dissenting opinion on this point by emphasizing the signiﬁcance of the Diet’s 
position in a representative democracy—that it established its legitimacy by 
establishing “equal, free and periodic elections35).”
Another significant point of this case was its decision to declare uncon-
stitutional the failure of the Diet to act more promptly on the matter (taking 
over ten years) without a rational reason and using this as a major point to 
decide for the plaintiffs based on the Government Redress Law36). According 
to the lead attorney for the case, asserting the illegality of not being able to 
vote during the 1996 Shugi’in Election and the unconstitutionality of the 
Public Ofﬁces Election Law for creating such a condition would be a difﬁcult 
task since the Supreme Court Judgment of November 21, 1985 (hereinafter, 
Home Voting System Case), involving a physically disabled voter who 
claimed that the abolishment of a home voting system and the Diet not rein-
stating this system violated his right to vote, declared that in cases when the 
Government Redress Law is used, the government’s inaction (in this case, 
reinstatement of the Home Voting System) must be considered an “extraor-
dinary instance” that clearly violated the provisions of the Constitution in 
order for the government to be liable to pay damages37). In recollection of 
the case, the lead attorney suggested that in having their claim being 
approved, the Supreme Court expanded its interpretation of the Home 
Voting System Case38).
A point brought up by Professor Munetaka Tanaka is noteworthy. It 
questioned the reasoning of the Supreme Court’s judgment on the issue sug-
gesting the Diet had no rational reason for taking so long to improve the 
election system after their attempt failed in 198439). Looking chronologically 
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after 1984 to what caused the possible failure of the Diet to follow up on the 
issue, Professor Tanaka suggested that the Diet was preoccupied with sev-
eral high priority reforms. For example, in 1985, the Supreme Cour t 
declared that the maximum discrepancy in apportioned seats among differ-
ent election districts of 1 to 4.40 to be unconstitutional40). As a result, the 
Diet was busy providing legislation to correct the malapportioned district 
seats. In 1987, the so-called Recruit Incident prompted the government to 
consider political reform that resulted in radical reforms on the controls of 
political campaign contributions as well as the election system. Discussions 
on these issues were finalized in 1994 and laws passed in 1995. In 1996, the 
first election was administered after the change to the mixed-member elec-
toral system—single-seat member districts and proportional representation 
constituencies. In lieu of these events, Professor Tanaka suggested that it 
may be fair to say that the Diet could not be considered to have been totally 
“negligent” in developing an overseas voters election system immediately 
after its failure to develop one in 198441).
This case confirmed the foundational aspects of Japan’s parliamentary 
democracy stressing popular sovereignty and the right of the people to elect 
their representatives. In this respect, the government had an affirmative 
duty in developing an overseas voters election system not only because of 
the development of the internet environment making communication more 
accessible on a global scale, but more so because voting is a fundamental 
right. This is directly in line with the understanding laid out at the end of 
World War II by the Potsdam Declaration promoting democracy for the 
future of the Japanese society, as well as, the basic understanding put forth 
by the Constitution of Japan.
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THE ISSUE OF NATIONALITY AND INFLUENCES OF 
INTERNATIONAL PERPSECTIVES
A.  The Nationality Law and the Necessary Conditions for Acquiring 
Nationality
Article 10 of the Constitution of Japan states, “The conditions necessary 
for being a Japanese national shall be determined by law.” In this manner, 
the Constitution designates authority to the Diet to establish the “conditions 
necessary” for the acquisition and loss of nationality. For natural acquisition 
of nationality, Japan has traditionally followed the principle of jus sanguinis. 
Article 2, paragraph 1 of the Kokuseki Ho (hereinafter, Nationality Law)42) 
states that a child is granted Japanese nationality: 1) When, at the time of its 
birth, the father or the mother is a Japanese national; 2) When the father 
who died prior to the birth of the child was a Japanese national at the time of 
his death; 3) When both parents are unknown or have no nationality in a 
case where the child is born in Japan.
Under Japanese law, the issue becomes more complicated when a child 
is born out of wedlock43). In cases where a Japanese mother and a foreign 
father have a child, the child (considered “illegitimate” because he/she is 
born out of wedlock) is granted Japanese nationality by reason of the child’s 
legal relationship with the mother at birth44). In cases where a Japanese 
father and a foreign mother have a child born out of wedlock, the child is 
granted Japanese nationality if the father acknowledges paternity before 
birth45). If for some reason the father acknowledges paternity after the birth 
of the child, nationality would only be granted if the father married with the 
mother thereafter to acknowledge the legitimacy of the child46). Otherwise, 
the child would only be able to acquire Japanese nationality through the nat-
uralization process47). The constitutionality of this differential treatment of 
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illegitimate children acknowledged by their fathers after birth (Article 3, 
paragraph 1, Nationality Law) became a legal dispute that culminated in the 
landmark Supreme Court Judgment of June 4, 200848). The Court’s judgment 
in favor of correcting this condition prompted the Diet to amend the Nationality 
Law immediately thereafter49).
B. The Illegitimate Child Nationality Case50)
The case51) involved a child who was born between a Japanese father 
and a Filipino mother out of wedlock. The father acknowledged paternity 
after the child’s birth in 1997. In 2003, the child submitted a notification of 
nationality to the Minister of Justice, but was denied for reason that the child 
did not meet the necessary conditions for Japanese nationality by birth52). 
Prior to this case, the mother and child were involved with a deportation 
case for overstaying the legally permitted period (Administrative Deportation 
Case No.411 (2002)). The case was settled on January 18, 2005 by the grant-
ing of a special residency permit extension for one year by the Minister of 
Justice53). After acknowledging paternity of the child in 1999, the father lived 
with the mother and child in a so-called “nai’en relationship.” In this relation-
ship, they also had another child, but in this case, the father acknowledged 
paternity before the child’s bir th54). The main dispute in the case was 
whether or not Article 3, paragraph 1 with its requirement of marriage after 
the father’s acknowledgement of paternity of the child after birth violated 
Article 14, the equality clause, of the Constitution. The Tokyo District Court 
based its decision on the Supreme Court Judgment of November 22, 200255) 
that used an approach which focused on nationality by birth to prevent 
unstable nationality decisions. Scholarly opinion at the time suggested that 
Article 2, paragraph 1 of the Nationality Law unfairly discriminated against 
children who were acknowledged after bir th violating Article 14 of the 
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Constitution because it denied retrospective effect for them56). The 2002 
Judgment denied retrospective effect of the acknowledgement of paternity 
under the Nationality Law although Article 784 of the Civil Code allowed 
for retrospective effect to the time of the child’s birth if there was acknowl-
edgment of the child by either father or mother. The Court noted that the 
Constitution declared that the Diet was responsible for matters pertaining to 
the acquisition and loss of nationality, and, any differential treatment would 
require a rational reason for its establishment57). Based on the 2002 Supreme 
Court Judgment, the Tokyo District Court’s decision focused on the reasons 
behind the differential treatment between legitimate and illegitimate chil-
dren. The deciding factor was why “marriage” was necessary for only illegiti-
mate children. Lawmakers explained that in addition to the principle of jus 
sanguinis for natural acquisition of nationality, the legislative intent to include 
marriage was to create a strong family relationship for the children acknowl-
edged after birth and as a result developing stronger connections with Japan 
and Japanese society. According to the lawmaker’s explanation, those chil-
dren who were subject to Article 3 in many cases had acquired foreign 
nationality and had close relations with that country. So, therefore, acknowl-
edgment of these children after birth required marriage of the parents to 
advance a closer connection or bond with Japan and its society58). The court, 
however, refuted this explanation by asserting that a “marriage relationship 
between mother and father” was not the only way of promoting strong family 
relationships. The court noted that many “nai’en relationships” established 
after acknowledgement of the child usually provide for a living environment 
similar to that of a family59). In a decision that surprised the attorneys of the 
case60), the court declared that there was no rational reason behind the dif-
ferential treatment between legitimate children within a marriage relation-
ship and illegitimate children within a “nai’en relationship” and that this 
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went against Article 14 of the Constitution. The court gave an expanded 
interpretation to include “nai’en relationships” into the requirement of “mar-
riage of father and mother” (Article 3, paragraph 1), and declared the part 
that stipulated “legitimate child” (Article 3, paragraph 1) as unconstitutional 
and granted the child in the case Japanese nationality61).
The High Court dismissed the case stating that the district court over-
stepped its bounds of judicial review in that they were making legislation 
(judicial law-making) by expanding interpretation of law and creating a new 
requirement for nationality acquisition62).
The Supreme Court Judgment of June 4, 2008 is the eighth case in 
which the Court has declared legislation unconstitutional. In doing so, it 
examined the constitutionality of the differential treatment required under 
Article 3, paragraph 1, and reviewed the legislative intent of the differential 
treatment63). The Court acknowledged the legislative intent of requiring 
marriage of the parents when the father of the child was Japanese and the 
mother was a foreigner, to be an approval of nationality assuring that the 
acknowledged child would have a life of unity with his/her father who was 
Japanese and to develop a connection with Japanese society through family 
life. The decision to include “marriage” into the nationality requirement was 
also supported by information explaining that there were many countries 
(during the time of legislative consideration) using the same procedure 
requiring marriage and acknowledgement of the child for nationality64). The 
Court agreed that the legislative intent was rational in 1984, however, 
brought up the following points to conclude that the legislative intent at the 
time of passage of Article 3, paragraph 1 could no longer be accepted65):
1) The changes that occurred in the social and economic environment 
that has affected the life style of the family and parent/child rela-
tionships in Japan which has made it dif ficult in measuring the 
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effects and impact of marriage on the relationship it has with devel-
oping connections with Japan and its society66);
2) The global trend in eliminating discrimination against illegitimate 
children, and Japan’s ratification of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights and the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child67);
3) The dif ferential treatment resulting in the discrimination of the 
Japanese father requiring marriage when acknowledging the child 
after birth, whereas if it were a child born between a Japanese 
mother and foreign father, nationality would be approved without 
marriage68);
4) The recognition that the children involved had no control over the 
requirement of marriage between their parents69);
5) The procedure of naturalization provided by Article 8, no. 1 did not 
allow for attaining nationality automatically, but was dependent on 
the discretion of the Minister of Justice and did not guarantee natu-
ralization even if the child was qualiﬁed70).
The concurring opinion written by Justice Izumi stated that “a strong 
legitimate reason” would be needed to prove the necessity for implementing 
the discriminatory treatment of Article 3 paragraph 1 since it involved social 
status and gender, hinting that the Court would use “strict scrutiny” or at 
least a “stricter” standard in its reviewing process71).
The Court concluded that the differential treatment of Article 3, para-
graph 1 as it stood lacked rationality and was an excessive requirement 
that was not aligned to the social and economic changes within and outside 
of Japan. It was therefore, unconstitutional and violated Article 14 of the 
Constitution72). As a remedy, the Court concluded that the child be granted 
212 ????????????????????
nationality and that Article 3, paragraph 1 be interpreted removing the part 
that required “the status of a legitimate child by marriage of the father and 
mother” for children who were born between a Japanese father and foreign 
mother and have been acknowledged paternity after birth so that they would 
be allowed to submit a notiﬁcation for nationality73).
The joint dissenting opinion of Justice Yoko’o, Justice Tsuno and Justice 
Furuta opposed the majority opinion stating that the case should have been 
dismissed and that the differential treatment required by Article 3, para-
graph 1 did not violate the Constitution on the grounds that matters pertain-
ing to nationality law—including the issue of legitimate children being able 
to receive nationality by notification and illegitimate children having to go 
through the naturalization process to attain nationality, in cases where 
acknowledgement of the child is done after birth—were within the discre-
tion of the government and that it was within the scope of legislative pol-
icy74). The dissenting opinion also questioned the majority opinion’s state-
ments that referred to the changes in life style of the family and parent/child 
relationships in Japan since they did not explain the details of these changes 
with concrete evidence75). The dissenting opinion did agree to the increase 
in countries, especially in Europe, for their changes in nationality policy to 
protect illegitimate children. But, added that the European countries had 
their own unique historic and regional reasons for changing policy as well as 
more international marriages due to the integration of the regions by the 
creation of the EU76). The dissenting opinion also criticized the majority 
opinion for taking the naturalization process under Article 8 and the whole 
system and structure of the nationality law too lightly77).
The other joint dissenting opinion by Justice Kai’naka and Justice 
Hirokago refuted the majority opinion’s position by stating that even if 
Article 3, paragraph 1 was unconstitutional, it should be up to the Diet to 
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resolve the problem and not the courts. The dissenting opinion opposed the 
method of remedy which was used because it would be judicial law-making 
establishing new nationality requirements78). Justice Imai’s concurring opin-
ion, joined by Justice Nasu and Justice Wakui, tried to support the majority 
opinions position by stating that the granting of nationality to the illegitimate 
child after interpreting Article 3, paragraph 1 by removing the problematic 
part of the paragraph was not creating new law and would not be infringing 
on the Diet’s authority of law making power79). Justice Kondo’s concurring 
opinion also agreed with Justice Imai’s opinion in that the Court’s remedy 
did not infringe on the Diet’s authority80).
Justice Tahara’s concurring opinion agreed with the judgment of the 
Court, and in support of the children’s nationality status, emphasized the 
importance of nationality acquisition for children below the age of 20 since it 
involved the right to education and social welfare rights81).
Justice Fujita wrote an independent opinion that suggested the problem 
was not related to what the majority opinion referred to as “an excessive 
requirement,” but rather a problem related to “insufficient requirements.” 
The proper remedy would be to supplement the insufficient portions and 
resolve the unconstitutional condition by rational interpretation. Normally, 
the Diet would be responsible in resolving the problem in the first instance, 
however, in cases where the Diet has already provided for legislative policy 
and nothing has been done to correct the problem (in this case, an unrea-
sonable dif ferential treatment) then a judicial remedy using a rational 
expanded interpretation of the law could be initiated if it was within the 
scope of the basic understanding of the legislative policy82).
C. The Significance of the Illegitimate Child Nationality Case
According to Professor Yasuji Nosaka, one significant point of the case 
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dealt with the influences caused by international and domestic changes83). 
According to the majority opinion, the differential treatment required by 
Article 3, paragraph 1 at the time of passage in 1984 (Law no. 45) was consid-
ered to be constitutional and in line with the principle of jus sanguinis rein-
forced with a legislative intent to strengthen the family bond between the 
Japanese father and the illegitimate child and to develop a closer connection 
or bond with Japan and Japanese society84). However, the majority opinion 
goes on to say that the changes in social and economic environment that 
occurred since 1984 have witnessed an increase in illegitimate children 
which has affected the life styles of the family and diversified the parent/
child relationships in Japan. Furthermore, the advancement of international 
exchange has also resulted in more children being born between Japanese 
fathers and foreign mothers. The life styles that they lead are quite “complex 
and diversified” compared to that of children born between Japanese par-
ents. Moreover, the global trend in eliminating discrimination of illegitimate 
children in various countries as well as the prohibition of the discrimination 
among children advanced by the International Covenant on Civil and Politi-
cal Rights and the Convention on the Rights of the Child are also strong 
influences85). After 1984, many countries have also amended their laws to 
accommodate illegitimate children with simply acknowledgment of paternity. 
The majority opinion concluded that with these changes, it was now difﬁcult 
to defend the rationality behind the differential treatment required in Article 
3, paragraph 186).
Another signiﬁcant point of this case involved the Judgment’s inﬂuence 
on “future” cases concerning illegitimate children87). According to Professor 
Noriyuki Inoue, the Judgment significantly altered the interpretation of the 
Supreme Court Judgment of July 5, 1995, which was a precedent in explain-
ing the rational grounds behind the differential treatment given to illegiti-
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mate children in terms of family inheritance matters established by Article 
900, no 4 (illegitimate children were allowed one half of that of illegitimate 
children)88). The 2008 Judgment can be interpreted to mean that the differ-
ential treatment which assigned illegitimate children one half the inheritance 
of legitimate children could be compared to an index to social value that 
equated to significant disadvantage/loss experienced by these children and 
could be judged as irrational and unfair89). Thereafter in 2013, the Supreme 
Court invalidated Article 900, no 4, by concluding that the respect for indi-
viduals had become more prominent in the family and that the disadvan-
tages/loss that resulted from matters over which illegitimate children had 
no control could not be accepted90).
In relation to previous cases that influenced or supported the outcome 
of the 2008 Judgment, the Supreme Court Judgment of 2002 is notewor-
thy91). The Court denied retrospective effect for children acknowledged after 
birth by their Japanese father under Article 2, paragraph 1 of the Nationality 
Law, but the two concurring opinions, one written by Justice Kameyama and 
the other one written by Justice Kajitani and Justice Takii mentioned Article 
3 to be problematic in requiring “marriage of father and mother92).” The con-
tent of the concurring opinion written by Justices Kajitani and Takii men-
tioned almost all of the reasons given by the later 2008 Judgment refuting 
the rationality of the legislative intent stated in 1984. These concurring opin-
ions were not the only voices in stating the problems of the Nationality Law, 
but surely they were an influential impetus in changing course and even 
overruling precedents.
CONCLUSION:  REALIZING THE CHANGING ENVIRONMENT 
AND CHANGING PERSPECTIVES
What is the role of the Supreme Court of Japan and how is it to engage 
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with the Diet, especially when it is to review laws for their constitutionality? 
In analyzing the cases reviewed by the Supreme Court between 1997 and 
2010, Professor Hidenori Tomatsu, explained that since the judiciary as a 
whole (including the Supreme Court) was limited to reviewing concrete 
cases or controversies, the judiciary could not be expected to be a leader in 
reforming future laws or the legal system in general since they were review-
ing disputed laws (and actions) and resolving them only after they reached 
the courts93). However, on a more positive note, Professor Tomatsu did sug-
gest in his analysis of the decade of cases that 1) the Supreme Court was 
quite active in handing down unconstitutional judgments during this decade 
(ﬁve unconstitutional judgments); 2) in handing down unconstitutional judg-
ments, the Court expanded its protection of human rights; 3) the Court used 
“strict scrutiny” for the first time (in the Overseas Voters Case) and other 
reviewing patterns in other cases that helped develop new standards in 
resolving legal disputes which promoted discussions in judicial review; and 4) 
there were significantly more “active” opinion writing by individual Justices 
of the Court than in the past, including signiﬁcant dissenting and concurring 
opinions that may have influential ef fects on future cases94). All in all, 
Professor Tomatsu concluded that the Court was still very “passive” in 
deciding on the constitutionality of laws.
One of the reasons for the Court’s “passivity,” as explained by Professor 
Hasebe, may come from the way laws are made in Japan, in that, many of the 
laws (bills) are initially drafted in the Hosei Shin’gikai (Consultative Council 
of Law) under the Ministry of Justice staffed by high-ranking officials from 
among judges and public prosecutors. And, for the bill to be proposed by the 
Cabinet, it has to be approved by the Cabinet Legislation Bureau which is 
also staffed by law experts from the judiciary and the government to check 
for internal consistency, coherence with the legal system as well as for the 
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bill’s constitutionality95). So, it can be generalized that the Court may be 
reluctant to “actively” decide on the constitutionality of any law since their 
role may be as Professor Hasebe suggested, “merely to sustain the legisla-
tive process by assuring its fairness and transparency96).”
In conclusion, the efforts of the Supreme Court in sustaining the legisla-
tive process will also include a hard look into the legislative facts as well as 
to consider the concrete changes that have been occurring domestically “and 
internationally” since the adoption of the disputed laws (provisions) and any 
other administrative actions. The laws that were invalidated by the Supreme 
Court in the two cases that were examined in this paper were laws that were 
considered legal and constitutional at the time of adoption, but were affected 
by the eventual economic and social and even “global” changes that 
occurred thereafter. The world, in fact, is changing more rapidly than ever 
before and Japan is signiﬁcantly affected by these changes. The “active” dis-
senting as well as concurring opinions (which sometimes are not noticed at 
the time of their announcement—a kind of “stealth activism” borrowing the 
term given by Professor Frank Upham97)) are signiﬁcant in indicating possi-
ble breakdown or failures in the disputed issues (laws, provisions and 
actions) brought to the Court. In this respect, the significance of minority 
opinions cannot be overemphasized. They can assist in discovering minor 
and sometimes major concerns that need to be seriously debated leading to 
alterations in previous ways of thinking. This can influence “future” Courts 
to act more boldly and possibly to change their perspectives to even over-
rule precedents. And, needless to say, in a constitutional democracy like 
Japan, the voices of the people will begin the process that will sustain justice 
and bring the Supreme Court into the spotlight for their role as the “Guardian 
of the Constitution.”
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NOTES
 1) Issues concerning “membership” and “citizenship” are complex constitutional 
issues. The limitation of space does not allow us to go into these topics in depth. 
Discussion on these issues will have to wait for another occasion.
 2) See, Zaigai Senkyo Seido, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, Japan, 
website: www.soumu.go.jp/senkyo/hoho.html (Last visited March 2017); See also, 
Koshoku Senkyo Ho (Public Offices Election Law), Chapter 4-2 Zaigai Senkyonin 
Meibo (Overseas Voters Electoral Register).
 3) See, Amendment of the Koshoku Senkyo Ho, Law No. 47 (1998).
 4) See, Koshoku Senkyo Ho, Law No. 62 (2006). The amended portion eliminated Sup-
plementary Section 8, for details, see, Kasagi, “Koshoku Senkyo Ho no Ichibu wo 
Kaisei suru Horitsu (Law Amending One Part of the Public Ofﬁces Election Law), 
1318 Jurist 23 (2006).
 5) See, N. Okazawa & K. Tonami eds., Zaigai Senkyo—Gaikoku Seido to Nihon no 
Kadai (Overseas Elections—Foreign Systems and Japan’s Problems), (Infomedia 
Japan, 1998), p. 432.
 6) Koshoku Senkyo Ho, Article 21, paragraph 1. Also, before the amendment, Article 
15, paragraph 1 of the Jumin Kihon Daicho Ho (Basic Residence Registry Law) 
required local residency to vote which meant that citizens who were sent overseas 
could not vote for any of the elections because a prerequisite to register with the 
local electoral commission required each prospective voter to have a local address 
registered under the local Jumin Kihon Daicho (Basic Residence Registry).
 7) For a detailed explanation on the legislative process and sequence of events per-
taining to the development of the 1984 and 1997 proposals of the Overseas Voters 
Election Law, see Okazawa & Tonami, supra note 5, pp. 433-39.
 8) Id., p. 433.
 9) Id.
10) Id., pp. 433-44.
11) Id., p. 434.
12) Id., pp. 487-92. The “Research Report” mentions the following nine points to be 
considered:
1) The Preamble of the Constitution states that sovereignty is derived from the 
people and that the authority of which is exercised by the representatives of 
the people. And, that the people have the inalienable right to choose and dis-
miss their public ofﬁcials;
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2) The principle of equality declared in Article 14 (of the Constitution) must be 
enforced strictly within the framework of election rights;
3) Voting qualiﬁcations are established by the Public Ofﬁces Election Law (estab-
lished in 1950, Law No. 100). Article 21 of this law states that the elector quali-
fies to be registered in the relevant local voting district where he/she has 
resided for more than three months. This system established by the Public 
Offices Election Law under the Constitution does not allow election rights for 
Japanese citizen residing overseas;
4) There are many dif ficulties involved in the realization of voting rights for 
Japanese citizen residing overseas, however, unless the government can prove 
that there is a compelling interest, it is an unfair restriction to completely disal-
low the execution of election rights just for being overseas;
5) When the present Public Offices Election Law was established in 1950, there 
were few Japanese citizens residing overseas. However, at present (1992), 
there are approximately 680,000 Japanese citizens residing overseas and at 
least 500,000 of them have been disallowed election rights. We cannot allow so 
many citizens not being able to participate in the political process;
6) The three months domestic residential requirement of the Public Ofﬁces Elec-
tion Law violates Article 25 of the International Covenants on Civil and Political 
Rights adopted by Japan in 1979;
7) The Public Offices Election Law has been in force for more than forty years 
without any amendment. The present condition that disallows election rights to 
Japanese citizens residing overseas goes against the Constitution without any 
reasonable reason and takes away this right from a significant number of peo-
ple. The government submitted a bill to the Diet in 1984 to guarantee election 
rights for Japanese citizen residing overseas. However, the bill was officially 
abandoned due to the dissolution of the House of Representatives in 1986 and 
the government’s failure in leaving this unconstitutional condition untouched 
for over 10 years cannot be tolerated;
8) Therefore, the Diet should immediately take measures to adopt legislation to 
provide election rights for Japanese citizens residing overseas. This should not 
be limited to one part of the election system, but the right to vote should cover 
the entire national election system. The right to vote should also be allowed for 
Japanese citizens residing overseas for long term as well as for permanent resi-
dents;
9) In addition to allowing Japanese citizens residing overseas to vote in national 
elections, they should also be allowed to vote in the National Review for 
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Justices of the Supreme Court.
13) Id., pp. 493-94.
14) Id., pp. 434-45. See, Tokyo District Court Decision, October 28, 1999, 59 Minshu 
2216.
15) Supreme Court Judgment, Grand Bench, September 14, 2005, 59 Minshu 2087. 
For an English commentar y of this case, see Matsui, “The voting rights of 
Japanese citizens living abroad,” 5 (2) Int. J. Const. Law 332 (2007). A digital copy 
of the article can be found at: http://icon.oxfordjournals.org/content/5/2/332.full 
(Last visited March 2017).
16) The Japanese election system for both House of Representatives and House of 
Councillors is a combination of single-seat member districts and proportional rep-
resentation constituencies. For an explanation of the election reform of 1994 that 
changed the electoral system from a single nontransferable vote system into a 
mixed-member majoritarian system, see F. Rosenbluth & M. Thies, Japan Trans-
formed-Political Change and Economic Restructuring, (Princeton Univ. Press, 
2019), Chapter 6; also see, Kobayashi and Tsukiyama, “LDP Factions under 
SNTV and MMM,” in N. Batto, Chi Huang, A. Tan, G. Cox, eds., Mixed-Member 
Electoral System in Constitutional Context, (U. of Michigan Press, 2016), pp. 
73-101.
17) See, 1999 Tokyo District Court Decision, supra note 14, p. 2216.
18) See, Public Office Elections Law (1998, Law No. 47), Chapter 4-2, Article 42, para-
graph 1 and 2.
19) Id.
20) Id., Supplement, Section 8.
21) See, Tokyo High Court Decision, November 8, 2000, 59 Minshu 2231.
22) See, 2005 Supreme Court Judgement, supra note 15, p. 2089.
23) Id., p. 2097.
24) Id., p. 2098.
25) Id.
26) Id., p. 2100.
27) Id., pp. 2101-2102.
28) Id., pp. 2105-2106.
29) Id.
30) Id., p. 2109.
31) Id., p. 2103.
32) Id., p. 2104.
33) See, “Teidan—Zaigai Hojin Senkyoken Daihotei Hanketsu wo Megutte (Three 
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Party Discussion—Grand Bench Judgment on the Right to Vote for Japanese 
Citizens Residing Overseas),” 1303 Jurist 2 (2005).
34) 2005 Supreme Court Judgement, supra note 15, pp. 2105-2106.
35) For Justice Fukuda’s Concurring Opinion, see, Id., pp. 2102-2104.
36) The use of the Government Redress Law in challenging the constitutionality of the 
legislative inactivity opened up a new method in constitutional litigation. See, 
Teidan supra note 33, p. 16.
37) See, Supreme Court Judgment, November 21, 1985, 89 Minshu 1512.
38) See, Kitamura, “Zaigai Hojin Senkyoken Sosho Saikosai Hanketsu (Supreme Court 
Judgment on the Overseas Citizens Election System Case),” pp. 213-214, in Y. 
Hasebe, ed., Ronkyu Kempo—Kempo no Kako kara Mirai he (Inquiries into the 
Constitution: Its Diachronic Trajectory), (Yuhikaku, 2015), p. 201. See, also, 
Nonaka, “Zaigai Senkyosei Ichibu Iken Hanketsu no Igi to Mondai ten (The 
Signiﬁcance and Issues Involved in the Partial Unconstitutionality of the Overseas 
Voters Election System)” 1303 Jurist 18 (2005). According to Professor Toshihiko 
Nonaka, the Court narrowly tailored the decision to limit the discretion of the Diet 
in comparison to the Home Voting System Case (1985), and provided for more 
ﬂexibility in the standard addressed in the Home Voting System Case (pp. 22-23). 
From an administrative law perspective with similar conclusions, see, Kitamura, 
“Zaigai Nihonjin Senkyoken Hakudatsu Sosho ni okeru Gyoseiho’jo no Ronten ni 
tsuite (Administrative Law Issues Concerning the Overseas Japanese Citizens 
Voting Rights Case),” 1303 Jurist 25 (2005).
39) See, Teidan, supra note 33, p. 2.
40) Supreme Court Grand Bench Judgment, July 17, 1985, 39 Minshu 1100.
41) See, Teidan, supra note 33, pp. 6-7.
42) Law No. 88 (2008).
43) See, Sano, “Kokuseki Ho Iken Hanketsu to Kokuseki Ho no Kadai (The 
Unconstitutionality of the Nationality Law and Issues Concerning the Nationality 
Law),” 1366 Jurist 85, 87 (2008).
44) See, Ho no Tekiyo ni Kansuru Tsusoku Ho (Provision on the Application of Laws), 
Law no.78 (2006), Article 29, paragraph 1.
45) See, Article 2, paragraph 1, Nationality Law.
46) See, Article 3, paragraph 1, Nationality Law (1984, Law no. 45).
47) See Article, 8 paragraph 1, Nationality Law.
48) Supreme Court Grand Bench Judgment of June 4, 2008, 62 Minshu 1367.
49) See, Akiyama “Kokuseki Ho no Ichibu wo Kaisei suru Horitsu no Gaiyo (Outline 
of the Law that Concerned the Partial Amendment of the Nationality Law),” 1374 
222 ????????????????????
Jurist 2 (2009). The law was partially amended on December 5, 2008 (Law no 88). 
It took effect on January 1, 2009. The provision which included both the “marriage 
requirement” of the parents and the “proof of the legitimacy status of the child 
through acknowledgment,” was amended to only require “acknowledgement of 
the child by either father or mother.” In addition to this, Article 20 (Nationality 
Law) was added to include penalties for submitting false information for attaining 
nationality. The penalty included less than one year in prison or a fine of less than 
200 thousand yen. 
 　In relation to voting rights and citizens residing overseas, there is another issue 
that involves the National Review of Supreme Court Justices after they are 
appointed.  This national review is conducted during the general elections for the 
House of Representatives (see, Article 79, paragraph 2, 3 and 4 of the Constitu-
tion).  In a court case questioning the constitutionality of the absence of this 
national review of Justices after the establishment of the Overseas Voters Election 
System, the Tokyo District Court denied the plaintiffs’ claims by explaining that 
although there was a dramatic advance in communication technology which ques-
tions the absence of the national review of Justices of the Supreme Court for those 
residing overseas, it cannot be judged that the situation is at an unconstitutional 
status without more discussion.  In addition, the court suggested that a reasonable 
period time for the Diet to consider legislation to correct the matter has not 
elapsed yet.  The government’s explanation for the delay concerns the difﬁculty in 
preparation process of the voters’ review ballots since the contents (names of the 
Justices up for review) are confirmed on the same day of the election campaign 
announcement.  See, Tokyo District Court Decision, April 26, 2011, 2136 Hanrei 
Jiho 13.  See also, Hatajiri, “Zaigai Nihon Kokumin no Saikosaibansho Saibankan 
Kokumin Shinsa (Right to the Review of Justices of the Supreme Court for Citi-
zens Residing Overseas)” 1440 Jurist (Juyo Hanrei Kaisetsu ed.) 14.
50) 2008 Supreme Court Judgment, supra note 48, p. 1367. For an English written 
commentary on the case, see Okuda & Nasu, “Constitutionality of the Japanese 
Nationality Act: A Commentary on the Supreme Court’s Decision on 4 June 2008,” 
26 Journal of Japanese Law 101 (2008). Copy of article is available at: http://sydney. 
edu.au/law/anjel/documents/2008/ZJapanR26_11_Okuda_Nasu.pdf (last visited 
April 30, 2017)
51) Actually, two cases were brought together and decided on the same day. Case 1 
being District Court Case of April 13, 2005, 1890 Hanrei Jiho 27, and Case 2 being 
District Court Case of March 29, 2006, 1932 Hanrei Jiho 51. Both district level 
decisions ruled that Article 3, paragraph 1 (Nationality Law) which established a 
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differential treatment for illegitimate children requiring the parents to marry to 
acquire nationality violated Article 14 of the Constitution. Both cases were over-
ruled in the High Court (appealed case for Case 1, High Court Decision of 
February 28, 2006, 58 Katei Saiban Geppo 47; appealed case for Case 2, High 
Court Decision of February 27, 2007, can be found at: http://www.courts.go.jp/
hanrei/pdf/20071016113022.pdf. (last visited April 30, 2017) This paper will focus 
on Case 1.
52) 2005 Tokyo District Court Decision, supra note 51, p. 27, 31.
53) Id., p. 30. The special residency permit was granted according to Article 50 of the 
Shutsu’nyukoku Kanri oyobi Nanmin Nintei Ho (Immigration Control and Refugee 
Recognition Law) which give the Minister of Justice discretion in extending the 
stay for special circumstances, in this case the legal proceedings disputing the 
nationality law.
54) Nai’en relationship meaning living together as a family without getting married.
55) Supreme Court Judgment, November 22, 2002, 1808 Hanrei Jiho 55.
56) For example, Ninomiya, “Kokuseki Ho ni okeru Kongai-shi Sabetsu no Kento 
(Examiniation of the Discrimination of Children Born Out of Wedlock within the 
Nationality Law),” 1078 Jurist 49 (1995); Torii, “Hanhi—Kokuseki Hojo, Ninchi ni 
Sakkyuko wo Mitomenai koto no Gokensei Oyobi Jinken Sho’joyaku he no 
Tekigosei (Case Analysis—Nationality Law and The Constitutionality of the Denial 
of Retrospective Effect after Acknowledgement and Its Application to Human 
Rights Treaties),” 1197 Jurist 93 (2001).
57) The Supreme Court Judgment of November 22, 2002 was a harsh opinion from the 
appellant’s point of view, however, two concurring opinions, one written by Justice 
Kameyama and the other written by Justices Kajitani and Takii are noteworthy 
since these opinions may have inﬂuenced the “future” Courts to change course—
especially in influencing the 2008 Supreme Court Judgment reviewing Article 3, 
paragraph 1 of the Nationality Law. In Justices Kajitani and Takii’s concurring 
opinion, they question the differential treatment between legitimate and illegiti-
mate children and also refer to the “changing values and diversity of the living 
styles of the family” emphasizing the difficulty in limiting nationality to married 
parents when they have acknowledged their children after birth. See, 1080 Hanrei 
Jiho 55, 58 (2002).
58) 2005 Tokyo District Court Decision, supra note 51, pp. 35-37. According to Profes-
sor Kenji Ishikawa, the legislative intent of the differential treatment in Article 3, 
paragraph 1 and the court’s interpretation stressing the need for a closer bond 
with the family and Japanese society reflect the emphasis of the Japanese social 
224 ????????????????????
concept of “kizuna.” See, Ishikawa, “Kokuseki-ho Iken Daihotei Hanketsu wo 
Megut’te—Kempo no Kanten kara (1) (The Grand Bench Judgement of the Con-
stitutionality of the Nationality Law—From a Constitutional Viewpoint (1)),” 343 
Hogaku Kyoshitsu 35, 39 (2009).
59) Id., p. 39. 
60) See, Okuda, “Kokuseki Ho Iken Sosho ni kansuru Saikosai Daihotei Hanketsu (The 
Supreme Court Judgment on the Constitutionality of the Nationality Law),” 80 
Horitsu Jiho 1 (2008).
61) 2005 Tokyo District Court Decision, supra note 51, p. 40.
62) See, Tokyo High Court Decision of February 28, 2006, 58 Katei Saiban Geppo 47.
63) See, 2008 Supreme Court Judgment, supra note, 48.
64) Id., pp. 1372-1373.
65) Id., pp. 1372-1377.
66) Id., pp. 1373-1374.
67) Id., p. 1374.
68) Id., pp. 1375-1376.
69) Id., p. 1376.
70) Id.
71) Id., p. 1380. See, “Teidan—Kokuseki Ho Iken Hanketsu wo Megutte (Three Party 
Discussion—Thinking About the Illegitimate Child Nationality Case),” 1366 Jurist 
44 (2008). According to Professor Kazuyuki Takahashi, the majority opinion does 
not directly mention strict scrutiny as their review standard, however, it is believed 
that when the majority opinion referred to Japanese nationality being an “important 
legal status” and the need to “review carefully,” this meant reviewing with strict 
scrutiny (p. 55). See also, Hasebe, “Kokuseki Ho Iken Hanketsu no Shiko Yoshiki 
(The Analytical Framework of the Illegitimate Child Nationality Case),” 1366 
Jurist 77 (2008). According to Professor Yasuo Hasebe, the majority opinion ini-
tially seemed to promote a less strict standard mentioning its review process to 
examine the “rationality” of the legislative intent behind the differential treatment 
in Article 3, paragraph 1, but at the same time suggesting a “stricter” standard by 
mentioning that Japanese nationality is “an important legal status” in that it guar-
antees fundamental human rights, vests citizens with public qualifications, and 
allows for public beneﬁts…and mentioning that the rational reason behind the dif-
ferential treatment in acquiring Japanese nationality “must be reviewed carefully” 
because the child has no control over his/her status which depends totally on his/
her parent’s marriage (pp. 77-78); also, Okuda and Nasu, supra note 50, p. 105.
72) Id., p. 1377.
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73) Id., pp. 1377-1380. See also, Ishikawa, “Kokuseki-ho Iken Daihotei Haketsu wo 
Megutte—Kempo no Kanten kara (2) (Concerning the Grand Bench Judgment of the 
Constitutionality of the Nationality Law—From a Constitutional Perspective (2))”, 
344 Hogaku Kyoshitsu 40 (2009). In analyzing the Judgment of the Court, Professor 
Kenji Ishikawa suggested that the decision to declare the “differential treatment” 
unconstitutional was based on a position of nationality using a “status” perspective 
instead of a “rights” perspective, and at the same time including arguments of con-
stitutional violations of equality. Its conclusion in a sense followed the analysis of 
previous Supreme Court precedents relating to nationality. (i.e, Supreme Court, 
Grand Bench, October 4, 1978, 32 Minshu 1223; and, Supreme Court, Grand 
Bench, January 26, 2005, 59 Minshu 128).
74) Id., p. 1399.
75) Id., p. 1400.
76) Id., p. 1401. See also, Harada, “Saikosai Heisei Nijunen Rokugatsu Yokka Daihotei 
Hanketsu wo Megutte—Shiho no Shiten kara (The Supreme Court Grand Bench 
Judgment of June 4, 2008—From an Private International Law Perspective),” 341 
Hogaku Kyoshitsu 7 (2009). Professor Harada suggests that the majority opinions 
point on the global trends in nationality policy on eliminating discrimination 
against illegitimate children was not persuasive in that the assertion did not 
explain the speciﬁc countries involved nor why these trends were occurring and to 
what extent these changes were important to the case. In mentioning this point, 
the majority opinion needed to explain the changes in nationality law and policy in 
countries similar to Japan (adopting the principle of jus sanguinis) in more detail (pp. 
18-19). On this point, see also, Okuda and Nasu, supra note 50, pp. 111-112; Y. 
Nosaka, Kenpo Kihon Hanrei wo Yomi’naosu (Rereading Basic Constitutional 
Cases), (Yuhikaku, 2011), pp. 465-469.
77) Id., pp. 1402-1403.
78) Id., p. 1408.
79) Id., p. 1386.
80) Id., p. 1392.
81) Id., p. 1388.
82) Id., pp. 1395-1396.
83) Nosaka, supra note 76, p. 464.
84) See, 2008 Supreme Court Judgment, supra note 48, pp. 1372-1373.
85) Professor Teruki Tsunemoto suggests that the Justices may have been inﬂuenced 
by the 1998 Committee Status Report on the concern of the treatment of illegiti-
mate children in Japan (of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights) 
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